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Abstract
We colour every point x of a probability space X according to the colours
of a finite list x1, x2, . . . , xk of points such that each of the xi, as a function
of x, is a measure preserving transformation. We ask two questions about
a colouring rule: (1) does there exist a finitely additive extension of the
probability measure for which the xi remain measure preserving and also a
colouring obeying the rule almost everywhere that is measurable with respect
to this extension?, and (2) does there exist any colouring obeying the rule
almost everywhere? If the answer to the first question is no and to the second
question yes, we say that the colouring rule is paradoxical. A paradoxical
colouring rule not only allows for a paradoxical partition of the space, it
requires one. We pay special attention to generalizations of the Hausdorff
paradox.
Key words: measurable colouring, Cayley graphs, Hausdorff Paradox, para-
doxes in measure theory
1 Introduction
H. Lebesgue asked if his measure can be defined on all subsets of the real line
R. A negative answer was provided by G. Vitali. Lebesgue measure λ on
R is a countably additive measure that is isometry invariant and such that
λ([0, 1]) = 1. Therefore, in the light of Vitali’s construction, it is natural to
ask if one can relax the condition of countable additivity and demand that
such a measure to be defined on all subsets of R. F. Hausdorff showed in
[3] that there is no finitely additive rotation-invariant measure µ defined on
all subsets of the unit sphere S2 and such that µ(S2) = 1. His construc-
tion can be easily modified to obtain that there is no isometry invariant
finitely additive measure µ defined on all subsets of Rn (n ≥ 3) and such
that µ([0, 1]n) = 1 (see [6] for a simple proof). Finally, S. Banach [1] proved
that there is a finitely additive measure with required properties in Rn for
n = 1, 2 (see [6], Cor. 12.9). Both Vitali’s and Hausdorff’s constructions use
Axiom of Choice (AC) for uncountable families of sets. Namely, the authors
construct some sets which then satisfy some rules (related to partitions of
the space) that violate conditions required by the measures in question.
In the present paper we reverse the above perspective. We consider how
to partition a probability space X into subsets A1, . . . , Ak according to rules
defined with a group or semi-group G acting on the space X in a measure
preserving way. We call such rules colouring rules, and we are interested in
colouring rules where the only sets that satisfy these rules cannot be measur-
able with respect to any finitely additive G-invariant measure µ extending
the initial probability measure such that µ(X) = 1. Furthermore we are
not really interested in such rules that are merely inconsistent, but rather in
those for which, using AC, the rule can be satisfied in some way. We call
colouring rules paradoxical when they can be satisfied almost everywhere but
never in the finitely additive measurable way described above.
Let us analyze closer the Hausdorff’s construction in [3] that the unit
sphere S2 can be decomposed, modulo a countable set D (the intersection
with the sphere of the set of all axes from the appropriate subgroup of rota-
tions) into the sets A,B and C satisfying the relation
(∗) A ∼= B ∼= C ∼= B ∪ C,
where ∼= denotes the congruence of sets. Here the congruences are witnessed
by a subgroup of SO3(R) isomorphic to Z2 ∗ Z3 (and for convenience we
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will call this subgroup Z2 ∗ Z3). With σ generating Z2 and τ generating
Z3, we have the set of rules σ(A) = B ∪ C, σ(B ∪ C) = A, τ(A) = B,
τ(B) = C, and τ(C) = A. We call these rules the Hausdorff colouring rules.
Measurability with respect to any measure (where both σ and τ are still
measure preserving) would require that both half and one-third of the space
must be taken by the set A. And from these three sets, we can also create six
sets that partition the whole space, namely A∩σ(B), A∩σ(C), τ(A∩σ(B)),
τ(A ∩ σ(C)), τ 2(A ∩ σ(B)) and τ 2(A ∩ σ(C)), such that by choosing the
appropriate rotations these six sets are congruent to two copies of the whole
sphere, modulo the countable set D.
Now we perceive the above congruences, using the actions σ and τ , as
two sets of colouring rules, with the colours A, B, and C. We colour any
point x according to the colours of τ−1(x) and σ(x). Suppose that τ−1(x)
is coloured already by B and σ(x) is coloured already by C; the σ part
of the rules say that x should be coloured A and the τ part of the rules
say that x should be coloured C. How could this conflict be reconciled?
One way would be to move further afield to determine the colour of x. For
example, one could specify a new colour E that can exist at only one point
in every orbit of Z2 ∗Z3, and then colour the rest of the orbit by A, B, and C
according to the group element needed to move to the point in question from
the representative coloured E (as was done in the original construction of the
Hausdorff paradox). After doing this, one could then assign the subset E to
the appropriate colour in A, B, or C as needed. To insure that there is one
and only one representative coloured E in every orbit we could require that
gx in E for any g ∈ Z2∗Z3\{e} implies that x cannot be in E and if gx is not
in E for any g ∈ Z2 ∗Z3\{e} then x must be in E. However for our purposes
such a set of rules based on the colour E is not satisfactory, not only because
an extra colour has been added. More importantly such a colouring rule
would be infinite in character. The determination of membership in A,B,C,
or E would involve an unbounded number of group elements.
We are interested only in colouring rules that are finitary in character,
meaning that there are finitely many colours and the colour of a point is
determined by finitely many group or semi-group elements. For the rest
of this paper we will assume that all colouring rules are finitary. Of special
interest are rules that always allow for some assigned colour (unlike the above
Hausdorff rules); we say that such colouring rules have rank one. Rank
one means that no matter how other point are coloured, there is always an
acceptable colouring for x. Rank one rules relate measure theoretic paradoxes
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to problems of optimisation, especially when that optimisation is limited
in scope. A determination of one best colour (or a subset of equivalently
optimal colours) according to finite many parameters is within the grasp of
an automaton.
Furthermore we allow for colouring rules that depend on the position in
the space X . For example, let X be {0, 1}G where the group or semi-group G
acts on X by the canonical right action: (g(x))h = xhg. There could be two
distinct set of rules, depending on whether the coordinate xe is equal to 0 or
1. We identify a special class of colouring rules: those that do not depend on
position, called stationary rules, with the others called non-stationary rules.
The distinction of stationary vs non-stationary plays an important role in this
paper, as there are spaces for which it is relatively easy to find a paradoxical
rank one non-stationary rule, yet it is unknown whether there are rank one
stationary paradoxical rules with the same number of colours. As we prefer
colouring rules that can be preformed by an automaton, it should be easy
to determine which part of the rule should apply. In general, we requires
that the change in rules should be measurable with respect to the original
probability distribution. But in all example presented here the spaces are
Cantor sets and the domains for the constant parts of the rules are cylinder
sets.
Ramsey Theory is a weakly related topic. A non-amenable group G
could act on two probability spaces X and Y such that every element in G is
measure preserving in both spaces. Assume there is a paradoxical colouring
rule for the space X using the group G and Y possesses a finitely additive
G-invariant extension defined on all subsets. The consequence would be that
these rules cannot be realised in any way on the space Y , though they would
not be contradictory in a logical way that is independent of the space. The
failure of the colouring rule on part of such a space Y is analogous to the
existence of a forbidden structure with Ramsey Theory. The main difference
with Ramsey Theory is that the relevant relations between the vertices to be
coloured (e.g. with edges or arithmetic progressions) are not locally bounded,
while our colouring rules are so bounded.
The above mentioned reversal of orientation, the primacy of the colouring
rules, is related to other approaches.
A proper colouring is a colouring of the edges of a graph such that no
two vertices connected by an edge are given the same colour. Placed into
our context of a group action, the edges of the graph are defined by the
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generators of a group acting on the probability space, hence in general orbits
isomorphic to the Cayley graph. The primary concern with Borel colouring
(the questions raised in [4]); is what is the Borel chromatic number, the least
number of colours needed for a proper colouring such that each colour class
defines a Borel measurable set. Furthermore there is interest in the ǫ-Borel
chromatic number – for every positive ǫ the least number of colours needed
for a proper colouring when the colours define Borel measurable sets and one
exempts a measurable set of size ǫ from the proper colouring requirement.
Notice with finitely many generators that proper colouring defines a colouring
rule in our context. Given a free action and a common degree to the Cayley
graph, unless the number of colours is larger than this common degree, proper
colouring defines a colouring rule that is not of rank one. The colouring rule
of the Hausdorff paradox is a restriction of the rule requiring only a proper
colouring with three colours. It adds only two requirements to the rule of
proper colouring, that the sets cycle A,B,C in the direction of τ , rather
than in the direction of τ−1, and that B opposite C (with respect to σ)
is not allowed. It is clear that the number of colours plays a central role in
proper colouring, that colourings into Borel sets is made much easier when the
number of colours increases. Likewise the number of colours plays a central
role with paradoxical colouring rule; both in making measurable colouring
easier but also in making it easier to transform a higher rank paradoxical
colouring rule to one that is rank one and mimicks the former rule.
With a one dimensional compact continuum of colours (a probability sim-
plex determined by two extremal colours) and a Cantor set (see conclusion
more of the connection to this paper), Simon and Tomkowicz [5] demon-
strated a colouring rule using a semi-group action for which there is no ǫ-
Borel colouring for sufficiently small ǫ > 0 (meaning a colouring function
that is Borel measurable and obeys the rule in all but a set of measure ǫ),
though there is a colouring that uses almost everywhere the two extremal
colours of the continuum.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The second section in-
troduces the basic definitions and some important initial results. The third
section demonstrates some examples of paradoxical colouring rules. The
fourth section looks at another example using semi-group action. The fifth
section applies inclusion-exclusion as it pertain to probability calculations
and a paradoxical colouring rules using the group generated freely by two
generators. The concluding section explores open questions and directions
for further study.
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2 The Basics
Let X be a probability space with F the sigma algebra on which a probabil-
ity measure m is defined. Usually X will have a topology and F will be the
induced Borel sets. We say that the relation R ⊆ X ×X is admissible if:
(i) for any x ∈ X there are only finitely many elements x1, ..., xk of X
such that (x, xi) ∈ R for i = 1, ..., k.
(ii) for almost all x ∈ X , R is irreflexive.
We will call the elements x1, ..., xk appearing in the (i) the descendants
of x; and we say that xi is in the i-th position of x.
Let R ⊆ X × X be an admissible relation. Let A = {A1, . . . , An} be a
finite set of colours. We say that F : X × Ak → 2A\{∅} is a colouring rule
of rank one on X if
(1) for every choice of of an element b in Ak the F (x, b) is a F measurable
function in x, and
(2) all descendants x1, . . . , xk are measure preserving transformations as
functions of x, with respect to F and m.
The colouring rule is stationary if F (x, b) is determined only by b. The
colouring rule is continuous if the probability space X has a topology, F are
the Borel sets, and for every choice of of an element b in Ak the F (x, b) is
a continuous function of x. All of our examples are continuous, with the
space X a Cantor set, and the different applications of the rule determined
by cylinder sets. A colouring rule of rank n is a collection of n colouring
rules of rank one such that they cannot be expressed as a collection of fewer
colouring rules of rank one.
A colouring c : X → A = {A1, . . . , An} satisfies a colouring rule F of
rank one at x ∈ X if almost everywhere (with respect to m) it follows that
c(x) ⊆ F (x, c(x1), . . . c(xn)). It satisfies a colouring rule of higher rank if it
satisfies all the correspondences F defining the colouring rules of rank one
that make up that colouring rule of higher rank.
We say that a rule on X is non-contradictory if it is satisfied by some
colouring. It is paradoxical if it is non-contradictory and for every finitely
additive extension µ of m for which the descendants are still measure pre-
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serving there is no colouring satisfying the rule almost everywhere such that
the sets defined by the colours are measurable with respect to µ.
3 First Examples
We need to establish that there are paradoxical rules of rank one. The first
example is that of a rank one non-stationary rule with five colours on a space
that may fail to have any paradoxical stationary rule of rank one using the
same number of colours. The second and third examples are that of a sta-
tionary rank one paradoxical rules which mimick the Hausdorff rules and
paradox. With the second example this is done by doubling the space and
with the third example by squaring the number of colours. We are not so
interested in the second and third examples because they represent a kind of
cutting of a Gordian knot. As stated in the conclusion, we would like to find
some way to differentiate between these two examples and the others.
Example 1: Let G be Z2 ∗Z5, with Z2 generated by σ and Z5 generated
by τ . The space X is {0, 1}G and there are five colours, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5.
All arithmetic is modulo 5 and we present the rules with some simplifying
abuse of notation. The rule is deterministic, meaning it is a function. We
assume that τ−1(x) is coloured Ai. If either x
e = 1, τ−1(x) is coloured A5
or σ(x) is coloured A1 then x is coloured Ai+1. Otherwise, if none of these
three conditions apply, x is coloured Ai.
Theorem 1: The colouring rule of Example 1 is paradoxical.
Proof: If the colouring is well defined and follows the colouring rule,
there are only two possibilities: every τ cycle (x, τ(x), τ 2(x), τ 3(x), τ 4(x)) is
all of the same colour (using a single colour Ai for some i) or it contains all
five colours. This allows us to make two independent calculations concerning
the proportion of the set coloured A1 (a proportion we assume exists under
the assumption of finitely additive measurability and G invariance).
First we estimate from below and outside the τ cycles the probability of
the set coloured A1. In every τ cycle, there are a certain number of points
whose e coordinates are 0. If just one of the e coordinates is 1, it is necessary
for the cycle to include all five colours. For each possibility for the number of
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points whose e coordinate is 0, the probabilities of these cycles are based on
1
25
= 1
32
and the binomial expansion. We consider the points opposite to the
cycle, namely the points {σ(x), σ ◦ τ(x), σ ◦ τ 2(x), σ ◦ τ 3(x), σ ◦ τ 4(x)}, and
see how many of them must be coloured A1. These calculations are based on
1
160
, with 160 = 32 · 5. The probability of either one or no such points in the
cycle with 0 as its e-coordinate is 1+5
32
, and in that case there need not be any
points opposite the cycle in A1 (as the one place x in the cycle where x
e = 0
could be the one place that is coloured A5). Following the same logic, if there
are exactly k points in the cycle whose e coordinate is 0, with 2 ≤ k ≤ 4,
then there must be at least k−1 points opposite the cycle coloured by A1. If
k = 5 then of course the entire cycle may be coloured with just one colour, not
requiring any opposite point to be in A1. The proportion of the space taken
up by the set A1 must be at least
1
5
(
(
5
2
)
+2 ·
(
5
3
)
+3 ·
(
5
4
)
) = 10
160
+ 20
160
+ 15
160
= 9
32
.
Second we estimate from above and inside a τ cycle the probability of
the set coloured A1. The probability of a τ cycle having the same colour
throughout cannot exceed 1
32
, the probability that all members of the cycle
have 0 for the e coordinate. Otherwise at most one-fifth of the cycle can be
in A1. This implies that the proportion of the set coloured A1 in the space
cannot exceed 1
32
+ 1
5
· 31
32
= 9
40
. Therefore the proportion, if it exists, must
be below 9
40
and above 9
32
, a contradiction.
A non-measurable colouring satisfying the above rule is essentially the
same as that for the Hausdorff paradox: all τ cycles go through all five
colours and all but one of the five points opposite to any cycle opposite are
coloured A1 (and the e coordinates are ignored). ✷
Example 2: Let G = Z2 ∗ Z3 and X = {R, S}×{0, 1}
G, with half prob-
ability given to both {R} × {0, 1} and {S} × {0, 1}. We define ρ to be the
measure preserving involution that switches between (R, x) and (S, x) for
every x ∈ {0, 1}G. As before, Z2 is generated by σ and Z3 is generated by
τ . We use the three colours A,B,C, the same from the Hausdorff rule. The
new rule is as follows. It assigns to every (S, y) the same colour as that of
(R, y). The rules for colouring the points of the form (R, y) are based on the
Hausdorff rules and are very easy to describe. We have described above the
rank two rules defining the Hausdorff paradox, determining the colour of y
according to the colours of σ(y) and τ−1(y). If the colour of (S, y) follows the
Hausdorff rule with respect to (R, σy) and (R, τ−1y) (after dropping the R
and S), then colour (R, y) the same colour as that of (S, y). Otherwise colour
(R, y) differently than (S, y), with either other way valid. In any colouring
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satisfying the rule the points (R, y) and (S, y) are given the same colour, im-
plying that the Hausdorff rules are being followed on both copies of {0, 1}G.
Example 3: Return to the uncopied space X = {0, 1}Z2∗Z3 . By using
nine colours, namely the pairs (A,A), (A,B), . . . , we can create an analogous
rule to that of Example 2, where the second colour of x is the copy of first
colour of σx, and the first colour of x agrees with the second colour of σx if
and only if the second colour of σx is the correct colour for x when following
the Hausdorff rule with respect to the first colours of σx and τ−1(x). This
shows that there is a stationary rank one paradoxical colouring rule that
recreates the Hausdorff paradox after dropping the second colour.
4 A colouring rule that is paradoxical using
a semi-group
Example 4: Let G = N0 ∗ Z2 be the free product with generators T and
σ, respectively, where N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, meaning that only non-negative
powers of T are used. There are two colours, A and B. Let X = {0, 1}G
be the Cantor space with the canonical measure m. Consider the following
colouring rule Q involving two colours A and B; (opposite to means using
the other colour) :
(i) if Tx is coloured A then colour x opposite to the colour of σx;
(ii) if Tx is coloured B and xe = 0 then colour x the same as colour of
σx;
(iii) if Tx is coloured B and xe = 1 then colour x opposite to the colour
of σx;
It seems that this colouring ruleQmust be more than paradoxical, namely
contradictory. Every pair x, y ∈ X determine four pairs of points z and σx
such that Tz = x, Tσz = y, namely the four possibilities of ze = 0, 1 com-
bined with (σz)e = 0, 1. Furthermore, from the measure preserving prop-
erties of T and σ the distribution m on X is determined independently by
those four choices of pairs and a choice of x and y in X × X in the T and
Tσ positions, according to the product measure m×m. If both x and y are
coloured B, then half of the four pairs of possibilities of z and σz cannot
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be coloured at all, since if ze = 0 and (σz)e = 1 (or vice versa) there is no
way to colour one or the other of these two points. Also, if x is coloured B
and y is coloured A then either the z satisfying ze = 0 or its twin σz cannot
be coloured. Hence from the measure preserving property of T and σ, any
positive measure r given to the subset coloured B results in at least r
4
of the
space being uncolourable according to the rule. On the other hand, from
the probability of at least 1
2
that (σx)e is equal to 1, the subset coloured A
cannot exceed a size of 5
6
, meaning that the colouring rule cannot hold in
at least 1
24
of the space. Clearly a measurable colouring is not possible by
any interpretation of measurability. But even without assuming that the sets
coloured A and B are measurable in any way, it seems that if they are to be
coloured, then it must be in a measurable way. If the colouring rule holds
almost everywhere relative to the Borel measure (with or without measur-
ability of any kind to the colouring), from the above logic the whole set B
presents a problem to the colouring of T−1(B)– therefore B should be con-
tained in a set of Borel measure zero. But this means that B is measurable
and of measure zero with respect to the completion of the Borel measure, a
contradiction.
Indeed showing that this colouring rule Q is paradoxical (e.g. also sat-
isfiable) is different from the previous examples. Rather than first showing
that the rule cannot be satisfied in any measurable way and then showing
satisfaction of the rule by some colouring, we reverse the process and show
first the satisfaction. In order to do this, we must use only part of the set X
and redefine the Borel measure to apply only to this subset. In this special
subset of X , the set coloured B will never be in the image of T , hence the
problem presented above will be avoided.
We define the functions α : X → X and β : X → X by α(x)e + xe = 1
(modulo 2), β(x)σ+xσ = 1 (modulo 2), and otherwise α(x)g = xg for all g 6= e
and β(x)g = xg for all g 6= σ. In other words, α switches the e coordinate
and β switches the σ coordinate. Both α and β are measure preserving
transformations. We include α(x) and β(x) among the descendents of x,
although they will play no rule in the colouring of x. We extend the semi
group G to G, the semigroup generated by G and α and β. From the above
analysis, for every pair of subsets D,E ⊆ X , α and β map the set T−1(D)∩
σT−1(E) back to itself.
We use the same approach that has been applied to Wiener processes and
the restriction to the paths that are continuous. With this approach, Ω is a
topological space with a regular Borel probability measure and C is a non-
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measurable subset of outer measure one. The subset C inherits the original
structure of the Borel measure through intersection, so that any Borel set B
of Ω defines a measurable subset B ∩C of C whose measure m(B ∩C) is the
same as m(B) (see [2] for more details).
We will show first that there is a colouring following the rule Q on a
subset X ′ of outer measure 1. Except for the outer measure, the method is
similar to that used in Simon and Tomkowicz [5]. The measure preserving
property of the T , σ, α and β remain after such a restriction to the set X ′.
We say that a set S(x) ⊆ X is the semigroup orbit of x if it has the form
{y ∈ X : y = U(x) and U is a semigroup word in T, σ}. A subset A of X
is pyramidic if for every x ∈ A the semigroup orbit of x is also in A. The link
R(y) of a point y is {U−1(y) | U is an element of G}. The semi-group orbit
of a point is a countable set, while its link is an uncountable set. However due
to the measure preserving property of all elements of G and that there are
countably many members of G, all links are sets of measure zero (following
from the atomless character of the probability space).
We define the outer measure m∗ of Y ⊆ X by
inf{m(L) : Y ⊆ L : L is an open set of X}.
Assuming the continuum hypothesis or weaker Martin’s axiom we have
the following theorem:
Theorem 2: There exists a pyramidic subset X ′ of outer measure one
and a colouring c of X ′ that satisfies the rule Q such that T (X ′) ⊆ A and
the set of points coloured A has outer measure 1.
Proof: We will be proceeding by transfinite induction. First we order all
uncountable compact subsets of {0, 1}G with positive measurem into a trans-
finite sequence {Kα}. Since {0, 1}
G is a separable space and the open sets
have a countable base, there are continuum many compact sets of {0, 1}G.
Pick now a point x0 ∈ K0 and colour it A. Then consider the semigroup orbit
S0 of x0 and colour it in the way that TV (x0) is always coloured A, where
V is a semigroup word in σ and T . Clearly, the colouring of S0 satisfies the
rule Q.
Suppose now that we have coloured the semigroup orbits S0, ..., Sβ for
some ordinal β < c. Clearly, the set Tβ =
⋃
i≤β Si has the cardinality m less
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then the continuum c (this follows from the fact that any cardinal number is
the least ordinal number with the given cardinality).
Now, given a point y ∈ Tβ, we consider the set of links R(y) and then
the set Wβ =
⋃
y∈Tβ
R(y). As the links are sets of measure zero, the set
Wβ =
⋃
y∈Tβ
R(y) is also a set of measure zero. Now take a point xβ+1 in
Kβ+1 \ Wβ . Clearly, for any word U ∈ G we have U(xβ+1) /∈ Tβ. Hence
we colour xβ+1 in A and we colour the remaining points in the semigroup
of xβ+1 in the way to satisfy the rule Q. Therefore for any compact set Kα
there is a point xα ∈ Kα coloured A. If A failed to have outer measure one,
there would have to be a cover of A by open sets whose measures add up to
strictly less than 1, hence there would have to be a compact set of measure
strictly greater than 0 with an empty intersection with A, something we have
excluded through the construction. Finally we define X ′ as the union of the
sets coloured A and B. ✷
Still there does seem to be something wrong with the above theorem.
With T measure preserving, one could think that X ′ = T−1T (X ′) should be
the same measure as that of T (X ′), which is the subset coloured A. This
would suggest, after an abuse of notation, that B = σ(A) is also of measure
one, a contradiction. But we never imply in the context of intersection with
X ′ that T (X ′) is a measurable set, and indeed the measurability of X ′ does
not imply the measurability of T (X ′) (as it is an uncountable to one function).
Corollary: The colouring rule Q applied to X ′ is paradoxical, given that
α and β are descendants and the finitely additive extensions are G invariant.
Proof: Having defined X ′ as above, we have a colouring into A and B
that satisfies the colouring rule. Now remove the initial partition of X ′ into
the two colours A and B and consider any colouring according to the rule Q
(not necessarily in the same way as we used to construct X ′). We assume
that this new colouring is measurable with respect to a finitely additive mea-
sure µ which is G invariant and according to this new colouring we call A the
subset coloured A and B the subset coloured B. With both α and β mapping
T−1(B) ∩ σT−1(B) to itself and T−1(B) ∩ σT−1(A) to itself, from the α and
β invariance we must conclude (for both sets) that the four possibilities for
the e and σ coordinates are equally likely (according to µ). Following the
same arguments as above, at least 1
24
of the space cannot not be coloured
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according to the rule Q, a contradiction. ✷
Note: An alternative approach would be to construct X ′ using orbits
and the links defined according to larger group G. In the proof of Theorem
2, one could try to make the set coloured A equal to the image T (X ′).
5 Inclusion-Exclusion principle
In this section we will present an application of the Inclusion-Exclusion prin-
ciple to paradoxical rules. Let µ be any finitely additive measure. The
inclusion-exclusion rule for finitely many sets A1, ..., Ak can be phrased as:
µ(
k⋃
i=1
Ai) =
k∑
j=1
(−1)j+1
( ∑
1≤i1≤...ij≤k
µ(Ai1 ∩ ... ∩ Aij )
)
.
Consider now some sets A1, A2 and A3 contained in X and such that
µ(A1) + µ(A2) + µ(A3) = 1. Then, by the Inclusion-Exclusion principle and
the fact that µ(X) = 1, we get that
(∗) µ(X)− µ(A1 ∪ A2 ∪A3) = µ(A1 ∩ A2) + µ(A2 ∩A3) +
µ(A1 ∩ A3)− µ(A1 ∩ A2 ∩A3) = 0.
Clearly, the same equality works, mutatis mutandis, for any k subsets
A1, ..., Ak of X such that µ(A1) + ... + µ(Ak) = 1. Of particular interest is
when B1, . . . , Bk partition a probability space and Ai = σiBi for some mea-
sure preserving transformations σ1, . . . , σk. If we can show that µ(Ai∩Aj) = 0
for all i 6= j then any argument that X\(A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak) should have positive
measure would be a contradiction to the measurability assumption.
The following example demonstrates a non-stationary paradoxical rule
with four colours for the space {0, 1}F2 using the inclusion-exclusion principle.
As F2 is isomorphic to a subgroup of Z2 ∗ Z3, this example shows also that
there is a paradoxical colouring rule for {0, 1}Z2∗Z3 with four colours. With
σ the generator of Z2 and τ the generator of Z3, this follows from the fact
that τστ 2σ and τ 2στσ generate of a subgroup of Z2 ∗ Z3 isomorphic to F2.
Example 5: With X = {a, b}F2 , initially there will be two colours, P
and N for positive and negative. Before specifying the rule determining the
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colouring, let Pi be the subset coloured positive such that the e coordinate is
i = a, b, and define Ni in the same way. Let Ta and Tb be the two generators of
F2. If we can create a rank one rule such that the four sets Ta(Na), T
−1
a (Pa),
Tb(Nb), T
−1
b (Pb) are mutually disjoint almost everywhere, then automatically
the rule must be paradoxical. This follows from the fact that the set of x
such that Ta(x)
e = b, T−1a (x)
e = b, Tb(x)
e = a, T−1b (x)
e = a is 1
16
of the
whole space, yet by the inclusion-exclusion principle the measure of this set
must be 0.
To define the rule, we will create four colours by splitting the initial two
colours P andN into four colours, P u, P c, Nu andN c, the C or U for whether
the vertex is “crowded” or “uncrowded”. Given any particular colouring, we
place an arrow from every x to one of its four neighbours. If xe = a, we place
an arrow from x to Ta(x) if x is coloured either P
u or P c and otherwise place
an arrow from x to T−1a (x). Likewise if x
e = b, we place an arrow from x
to Tb(x) if x is coloured P
C or PU and otherwise place an arrow from x to
T−1b (x). Now in defining the rule, we have to decide for every x ∈ X whether
to colour it P or N and whether to colour it crowded C or uncrowded U . The
rule is relatively simple. If xe = d with d ∈ {a, b} and Td(x) is uncrowded
and T−1d (x) is crowded then colour x with P . Likewise of x
e = d and Td(x)
is crowded and T−1d (x) is uncrowded, colour x with N . Otherwise if the
appropriate adjacent vertices are both uncrowded or crowded then colour x
however one wants. A vertex is coloured “crowded” or C if there are two or
more arrows pointed toward it and it is coloured “uncrowded” or U if there
is one or no arrows pointed toward it.
Theorem 3: The colouring rule of Example 5 is paradoxical.
Proof: We define the degree of a vertex as the number of potential arrows
that could be pointed toward this vertex. In other words, if (Ta(x))
e = a,
(T−1a (x))
e = b, (Tb(x))
e = b and (T−1b (x))
e = b then the degree of x is 3. If
(Ta(x))
e = b, (T−1a (x))
e = b, (Tb(x))
e = a and (T−1b (x))
e = a then the degree
of x is 0. As mentioned before, the degree zero vertices take up 1
16
of the
space. Our claim is that with a colouring satisfying the rule almost all vertices
are uncrowded. This implies that the colouring cannot be measurable with
respect to any finite extension for which the group F2 is measure preserving,
because at least 1
16
of the vertices cannot have any arrows points toward
them. By one accounting there is an arrow exiting every vertex but by
another accounting the average number of arrows coming in to vertices must
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be no more than 15
16
.
Now let us assume that x is a crowded vertex and see what is necessary
to maintain this situation in a colouring satisfying the rule. There must
be two distinct vertices y and z such that there is an arrow from y to x
and an arrow from z to x. Lets focus on just one of them, without loss of
generality the y. As the colouring rule is satisfied, the existence of an arrow
from y to x implies that the vertex opposite to x from y is another crowded
vertex, call it w. As the arrow is already defined from y to x it means that
there are at least two arrows pointed inward to w that do not start at y.
Letting v1 and v2 be two of those vertices, let u1 and u2 be the vertices
for which there could have be an arrow from vi to ui, however instead the
arrow was from the vi to w. We recognise by induction the existence of a
chain of backwardly directed arrows, starting at w, moving to u1 and u2 and
beyond, such that the induced graph is binary, has two branches at every
stage. (If there are three such branches in some places, we could reduce to
the existence of a binary tree). Each of these vertices of the binary tree has
degree at least three. Now let p be the probability of there existing such an
infinite chain, the probability relative to the start at a vertex like y moving
in the direction away from x. As the space is defined homogeneously (that
the probabilities for a or b are independent regardless of shift distances) we
can calculate p recursively. There are two possibilities, the next vertex w
could be of degree three and the chain of backward arrows continues with
these two adjacent vertices on the other side of y, or w is degree four and the
chain continues with at least two of these three vertices on the other side of
y. In the first case the conditional probability that w is of degree three is 3
8
(conditioned on the move from y to w) and then a continuation of the chain
indefinitely happens with probability p2. In the second case, the conditional
probability of degree four is 1
8
and the probability of continuation 3p2 − 2p3
(three choices for the two next vertices minus the possibility, counted twice,
that continuation is possible in all three directions). We have the formula
p = 3
8
p2 + 1
8
(3p2 − 2p3) = 3p
2−p3
4
. Factoring out the p = 0 solutions, we are
left with p2 − 3p + 4, which has no real solutions. We conclude that the
stochastic structure of degrees does not allow for crowded points to exist in
more than a set of measure zero.
Now we show (using AC) that there does exist a colouring satisfying the
rule. For every orbit choose a representative x and label every other vertex
in this same orbit as gx by the group element g used to travel from x to gx.
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Every group element g has a length, the minimal number of uses of Ta, T
−1
a ,
Tb and T
−1
b used to construct g (where the length of the identity is zero).
Let the length of a vertex gx in the orbit be the length of g. Colour x with
either colour. Colour all vertices of length 1 next, then all vertices of length
2, and so on. At every stage of the process, a vertex of length l is adjacent
to one vertex of length l − 1 and three of length l + 1. Therefore from any
vertex y of length l one can always point the arrow toward a vertex of length
l + 1, regardless of the value of ye. There can be no other arrow toward y,
as the three other points adjacent to y are all of length l + 2. ✷
6 Further study
Question 1: Given any probability space X and a finitely generated mea-
sure preserving group G acting onX , let P be the colouring rule that requires
only that the colouring must be proper. Is there such an X and G such that
the rule P is paradoxical?
A colouring rule with k colours is (stationarily) essential if it is paradox-
ical of rank at least two and there exists no (stationarily) paradoxical rank
one finitary rule with k colours whose satisfaction implies the satisfaction
of the original rule. A space X is (stationarily) essential with k colours if
there is no (stationarily) paradoxical rank one colouring rule with k colours
defined on X , and yet there is a paradoxical finitary rule with k colours de-
fined on X of higher rank. Intriguing is the difference between what can be
accomplished by stationary and non-stationary colouring rules.
Question 2: Is there is a non-stationary rank one paradoxical colouring
rule on X = {0, 1}Z2∗Z3 using the canonical measure preserving group action
of Z2 ∗ Z3 and three colours, but no such stationary paradoxical rank one
paradoxical colouring rule with three colours?
We conjecture that the answer to Question 2 is yes. In other words, we con-
jecture that this space with this group action is stationarily essential but not
essential. If indeed it is not stationarily essential, there remains the question
of whether the conventional Hausdorff rule of rank two is essential, utilising
either a stationary or non-stationary rule involving a larger number of de-
scendants.
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Question 3: Does there exist a space and a semi-group action that is
essential with respect to any number of colours?
Whenever at least one of the descendents is invertible and its inverse is
measure preserving (the latter following from the former whenever the space
is compact and the measure is Borel) then a colouring rule of any rank with
k colours can be mimicked by a rank one colouring rule with k2 colours in the
same way as with Example 3. But if none of the descendants are invertible,
it is plausible that some paradoxical colouring rules are not multi-functional
in character no matter how many colours are allowed.
There is something satisfying about Example 5 and unsatisfying about
Examples 2 and 3 (with Example 1 somewhere in between). Example 5
employs a stochastic process that seems to push colourings toward the satis-
faction of the rule. On the other hand, the existence of colourings witnessing
the rules of Examples 2 and 3 seems to be either accidental or contrived. One
could perceive satisfaction of a colouring rule to be a kind of fixed colouring,
with the colouring rule defining some kind of iterative process that does or
doesn’t bring the colourings closer to satisfaction of the rule. Of course if any
colouring rule forced almost everwhere (with respect to the original measure
m) an eventually stable colour in finitely many colouring stages (with respect
to some initial measurable colouring not satisfying the rule) then there would
be measurable colouring solutions and the rule could not be paradoxical.
Question 4: Is there a refinement to the definition of a rank one para-
doxical rule that identifies a credible force toward its satisfaction?
Suppose one had a colouring rule for SG where S is a finite set and G is
a group, and C are the finite set of colours. Another structure to consider
is {S × C}G, where we assume a random colouring start to SG inherited
from the C coordinate. We could consider how the colouring rule generates
iterations of colourings on {S × C}G.
The deficiency of a colouring rule on X is the infinum of all probabilities
ρ such that there is a F measurable subset of size 1−ρ such that the finitary
rule can be satisfied on this subset. The paradoxical s ize of a paradoxical
colouring rule on X is its deficiency. Likewise we define the paradoxical size
of a colouring rule as the difference between its deficiency and the supremum
on all r such that there is a satisfaction of the rules on a F measurable subset
of size 1− r.
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Do paradoxical colouring rules of arbitrarily small paradoxical sizes get
converted in an organic way to full paradoxical decompositions? With the
Hausdorff paradox the ambiguity concerning the size of the set coloured A,
that it should be both 1
2
and 1
3
, leads to a statement of “1 = 2” for the whole
space. More generally Tarski proved that the existence of a finitely additive
measure defined on all subsets is equivalent to the existence of a paradox in
the conventional sense, that there are disjoint sets B1, . . . , Bl of a subset E
of positive measure and measure preserving transformations σ1, . . . , σl with
σ1(B1), . . . , σl(Bl) forming two copies of E. If there is a paradoxical colour-
ing rule on X using a group G of measure preserving transformations, we
know automatically that X is non-amenable in character and thus has such
a paradoxical decomposition without any application of the paradoxical rule.
Question 5: Given a colouring c that satisfies a paradoxical colouring
rule, are there disjoint subsets B1, . . . , Bl of a set E of positive measure cre-
ating two copies of E using the measure preserving descendants such that
the Bi sets belonging to the smallest sigma algebra containing the original
F , the sets defined by the inverse images of the colouring c, and the shifts of
these sets as so defined by the descendents?
In the definition of a colouring rule, we use that the descendants are
measure preserving. This was a natural way to connect colouring rules to
measure theoretic paradoxes.
Question 6: Is there a more general definition for paradoxical colouring
rules (implying that the sets defined by the colours cannot not be measur-
able by any invariant finitely additive measure) that weakens the measure
preserving property of the descendants?
Question 7: When the space X to be coloured has a topology, is there
any significant distinction between the continuous and the more general non-
stationary colouring rules?
Usually optimisation concerns a choice of a point in a finite dimensional
convex set. We generalise to a definition of a probabilistic rank one colouring
rule in the following way. We keep the initial set up with X a probability
space and the finitely many descendants, but we change what is a colour.
The set of colours is A =
∏n
i=1∆(Ci), where each Ci is a finite set. The
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restriction on the choice of a colour is to a non-empty subset of A, a restric-
tion determined by x and the descendents p1, p2, . . . pk ∈ A
k in a measurable
way. The probabilistic colouring rule is normal if these non-empty subsets
of A are convex and as a correspondence defined by the x and the p1, . . . , pk
is upper-semi-continuous. We define satisfaction of the colouring rule in the
same way as before and understand by measurability with respect to a finitely
additive extension µ of X such that the inverse images of any Borel set in
A are µ measurable. As before, a probabilistic colouring rule is paradoxical
if it can be satisfied but not by any colouring function which is measurable
with respect to any finitely additive extension that maintains the measure
preserving property of the descendants.
Question 8: Does there exist a normal probabilistic rank one paradoxi-
cal colouring rule?
This would be of great importance to applications, as its affirmation would
suggest that there may be some very natural optimization problems that are
solvable in some way, but not in any way for which one can make any pre-
dictions.
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